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Abstract
Background: The general practitioner in Norway is expected to ensure equity and effectiveness
through fair rationing. At the same time, due to recent reforms of the Norwegian health care
sector, both the role of economic incentives and patient autonomy have been strengthened.
Studies indicate that modern general practitioners, both in Norway and in other countries are
uncomfortable with the gatekeeper role, but there is little knowledge about how general
practitioners experience rationing in practice.
Methods: Through focus group interviews with Norwegian general practitioners, we explore
physicians' attitudes toward factors of influence on medical decision making and how rationing
dilemmas are experienced in everyday practice.
Results: Four major concerns appeared in the group discussions: The obligation to ration health
care, professional autonomy, patient autonomy, and competition. A central finding was that the
physicians find rationing difficult because saying no in face to face relations often is felt
uncomfortable and in conflict with other important objectives for the general practitioner.
Conclusion: It is important to understand the association between using economic incentives in
the management of health care, increasing patient autonomy, and the willingness among physicians
to contribute to efficient, fair and legitimate resource allocation.
Background
The demand for health care services is rising in all Western
countries and governments are concerned with control-
ling costs and ensuring a fair allocation of resources [1,2].
The general practitioner (GP) is increasingly regarded as
holding a key role in securing equity and effectiveness [3].
In the wake of government concern, a number of studies
of rationing and the role of gatekeepers in health care have
appeared [4-6].
Rationing can be defined as the allocation of scarce
resources between patients with competing needs [7]; it
implies the withholding of potentially beneficial health
care through deliberate choice or through financial or
organisational features of the healthcare system in ques-
tion [8]. Related to studies of rationing is the concept of
opportunity cost, which can be defined as the value of the best
alternative which is forgone in order to get or produce more of
the commodity under consideration [9]. In health care deci-
sion making this signifies that any use of health care
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resources should be viewed as denying the opportunity
for some other patient to use the money for potentially
greater benefit [10].
The view of physicians as rationing agents, commonly
accepted by health economists and health administrators,
can be contrasted with a more traditional patient advo-
cacy view, where the physician is seen first of all as repre-
senting the best interests of each individual patient. Thus,
there is often said to be a conflict between the role of phy-
sicians as gatekeepers and as patients' advocates. This sim-
ple dichotomy is, however, misleading. Many
commentators have pointed out that it is possible to hold
multiple roles in the physician-patient relationship and
that what role one adopts is highly context sensitive [11-
13]. In fact, GPs are expected to both take care of the indi-
vidual patient's need and at the same time take account of
common resource use. In Norway, for example, this dual
responsibility is clearly stated in the Norwegian Medical
Association's ethical guidelines [14].
The gatekeeper role is one of many dilemmas. A Norwe-
gian study from 1993 showed that among a selection of
general practitioners, 93% had experienced a conflict
between responsibility towards the individual patient and
the requirement to manage the health budget [15]. Both
British and North American studies of physicians' atti-
tudes to rationing in their practices indicate that GPs are
increasingly uncomfortable with the gatekeeper role
[5,16,17]. In the case of Norway, we know that Norwegian
GPs are reluctant to function as gatekeepers [18], referral
rates are increasing [19], and that guidelines for rationing
seldom are adhered to [20].
The Norwegian government has expanded the use of eco-
nomic incentives and market mechanisms in the health
sector, while still relying on GPs to filter access to a
number of specialised services including both drug and
non-drug treatments. In some areas, e.g. the prescription
of some common drugs covered by the National Insur-
ance Scheme, the government provides guidelines for
rationing. Yet in most instances (e.g. referrals), the GPs are
expected to use their best professional judgement to
secure an effective and fair allocation of resources.
In 2001 a list-based system was introduced in general
practice covering practically the whole population. In
addition the payment system was altered from a combina-
tion of fee-for-service payment and a practice allowance
component, to the current system where the fixed compo-
nent is replaced by a capitation part. Every GP is granted a
fixed remuneration for each person listed, while the rest of
the income comes from activity based remunerations and
a small out of pocket fee. The Norwegian GPs have no
budget responsibility (as e.g. in the UK fund-holding sys-
tem). The introduction of the patient-list system was seen
as a step towards increased patient rights and adequate
access to health care. In 1999 The Patients' Rights Act was
passed which accentuate the patients' autonomy, e.g. the
right to free choice of hospitals and the right to be
informed and involved in medical decision making [21].
We have described elsewhere how the new incentive struc-
ture enhances competition and motivation for fulfilling
patients' expectations and thereby weakening the GPs
commitment to the gatekeeper role [22].
There is an ongoing debate among scholars about how to
understand GP behaviour in clinical decision making. In
principal-agent theory, the GP is seen as a rational actor
who maximizes utility, but there has been considerable
divergence in which motivators that are considered rele-
vant in the utility function [3,23]. Alternative models crit-
icise the principal-agent theory for ignoring the influence
of norms and altruism in physicians' discretionary
choices. The bottom line of empiric research seems to be
that economic incentives do have an effect on GPs discre-
tionary choices, but other factors, especially medical con-
siderations and professional norms seem to be more
influential [23,24]. Some authors have warned that the
use of economic incentives in the management of physi-
cians may backfire and ultimately undermine profes-
sional norms [25,26].
In order to achieve the goals of efficient and fair resource
allocation, it is vital to understand how the agents of
rationing, in this case GPs, experience and manage their
gatekeeper role. If the gatekeepers find it impossible to act
according to common principles for rationing and prior-
ity setting, there will be no rationing or rationing will be
haphazard and unfair. However, we know little about
physicians' experience of and attitude to these reported
rationing dilemmas in general practice [16,18].
The aim of this article is to explore how Norwegian GPs
experience rationing dilemmas in everyday practice. In the
context that our study was conducted, we anticipated eco-
nomic incentives and patient claims to be of importance
in GPs decision making, but we were open for other sug-
gestions from the interview participants and were aiming
at finding out what factors where important in the view of
the GPs themselves. We were also interested in under-
standing how one motivating factor is balanced against
another.
Materials and methods
This empirical study relies on data collected in 11 focus
group interviews with a total of 81 participants, all of
whom were Norwegian primary care physicians. The
interviews took place in spring 2002 as part of a national
evaluation study in connection with the introduction of aBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:70 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/70
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capitation-based patient list system in primary health
care.
A purposive sample was recruited from tutorial groups
and specialists' continuous education groups in the coun-
ties of Hordaland and Oslo. Both rural and urban munic-
ipalities are represented (67.5% of the participants had
their practice in an urban municipality). The sample was
chosen to represent well-known differences and typical
practices. In the final sample, 58% were male and length
of experience as a GP varied between 0.5 and 27 years with
a mean of 11 years. We invited 23 groups to participate by
sending a letter by mail to the group co-ordinators, and
followed up the invitations with telephone calls. Of these,
13 groups wished to participate, two declined and eight
were difficult to reach by telephone. Among the 13 posi-
tive answers, 11 groups were interviewed. The groups were
homogenous with respect to age and work experience
and, with the exception of one group, balanced with
respect to gender.
The data were collected through semi-structured focus
group interviews and a short questionnaire given to all
participants at the start of each interview. The interview
guide was tested in the first group interview, after which a
number of changes in the wording were decided. After
this, following the recommended procedure in the frame-
work approach [27], the questions were not changed again.
The interviews were conducted by the authors; a social sci-
entist trained in social anthropology and a GP and profes-
sor in medical ethics. Interviews lasted between one and
two hours, and the discussion was audio taped and tran-
scribed for subsequent analysis. Each interview began
with an introduction by one of the researchers who clari-
fied the study's focus and central concepts after which dis-
cussion between the participants was encouraged.
The introduction presented our underlying assumption
about discretionary choices [28]. The main message was
as follows: "Even when practice is based on the methods
of evidence-based medicine, numerous grey areas and
uncertain indications for treatment remain. Physicians are
therefore key actors in rationing decisions and the scope
for discretion is wide. It is in these grey zones of discre-
tionary choices that everyday decision making shapes the
content and volume of medical practice."
We focused on three types of decisions where there are
substantial grey areas and where the scope for discretion
is known to be wide:
- The prescription of reimbursed drugs
- The referral of patients to secondary care
- The issuing of sickness certificates
The physicians then discussed how they perceived that
different factors influence their professional discretion.
We used an interview guide with 12 questions focusing on
the informants' view of the gatekeeper role, how to bal-
ance the obligation to serve the individual patient vs.
rationing and their experience with difficult rationing
decisions. We asked specifically of how the relationship
with patients and economic incentives affect how they
make rationing decisions. As the focus of the study was
rationing dilemmas, the participants were encouraged to
consider the problematic cases.
Analysis
The transcripts were coded by hand. Initially the state-
ments in the transcripts of the first four interviews were
condensed as keywords and short phrases based on both
the original framework and new themes introduced by the
informants. This was conducted separately by the two
authors. Then the two sets of coded texts were compared
and the researchers agreed upon a system of categorisa-
tion based on recurrent subjects in the keywords. The ana-
lytical steps were inspired both by Kvale's eminent
description of coding and categorisation [29] and by
Ritchie and Spencer's analytical steps in the framework
approach [27].
The quotes presented here are not necessarily the best for-
mulated or the most striking. Rather we have tried to
select representative statements that were not too long
and that can be understood when separated from the con-
text. We have translated the statements from Norwegian
to English.
Ethical considerations
The project has been reviewed and approved by the Nor-
wegian Social Science Data Service against the privacy and
license requirements of the Personal Data Registers Act
and the guidelines for research ethics in the social sci-
ences, law and the humanities according to the National
Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and
the Humanities. All respondents were informed about
anonymity issues, their right to withdraw from the study
and the purpose of the study.
Results
When describing discretionary choices, respondents'
answers centred around four major topics:
- The obligation to ration health care
- Professional autonomy
- Patient autonomyBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:70 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/70
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- Competition
In the following section, we report the results of our anal-
ysis of the four major issues of special concern. Many of
the citations are related to more than one of the major
topics. This is quite illustrative of how the different factors
seem to be constantly weighed against one another but
also intertwined when the informants are describing inci-
dents of making discretionary choices.
The obligation to ration health care
Participants described many cases of how demanding
patients induce them to act as patients' advocate and
neglect the gatekeeper role, although some of them
stressed that in most instances they have no problems bal-
ancing the two roles, for instance through informing and
reasoning with the patient. Others stated that they experi-
ence a predicament between rationing on society's behalf
and offering the best service available to the consulting
patient. In the words of one of the participants: Saying no
is no easy matter.
Below three informants are discussing reasons for giving
in to patients' claims for referrals:
Informant 1: The patients who want a referral to a specialist
have made up their mind beforehand that that's what they
want. And then I find it quite difficult to explain to them that
they don't need it.
Informant 2: And it takes twice as much time.
Informant 3: I feel in a way that I have to offer good service. I
don't want anyone to leave my list. I don't want a bad reputa-
tion, do I? I live in the same place that I work and I want to
please people.
(Three participants in a spesialists' group, Oslo)
Many times informants exclaimed that they just can not
bring themselves to say no when patients are insistent.
Instead of saying no, other strategies are used to evade
conflict as this story illustrates:
I often find it hard and very time consuming to get people to
change their minds. The most recent example that comes to
mind was an elderly lady. I finally ended up saying, "Yes, I
think that before we go any further I should refer you to a rheu-
matologist who can assess your need for this treatment, and
then we can talk." It was perhaps a bit cowardly of me. I could
have told her, "You won't get that treatment from me and if you
want me to be your doctor that's the way it's going to be." But
I couldn't face doing that so I referred her; so now she has to go
to the rheumatologist and then come back to me and then we'll
see. Hopefully he agrees with me.
(Male GP specialist, 26 years of experience as a GP)
Another finding, however, was a lack of awareness among
several of the respondents about the need for rationing
and the reasons behind government guidelines and regu-
lations. Some said that they do not see the point in ration-
ing when the costs involved are small.
I believe that as GPs we very rarely consider the aspect of public
finances, that we for instance refrain from making a referral
because of high public costs. We usually use more rational argu-
ments related to what is best for the patient, then we argue that
the patient will not benefit much from a certain referral and
therefore we will not refer. We try not to think too much that
this implicitly means less public expenditure, so that only to a
small degree do we make our decisions based on the common
good.
(Male GP, 4 years of experience as a GP)
Many were unsure of what are expected of them as gate-
keeper. Several seemed to have solved the quandary by
concluding that when a GP spends time and effort in try-
ing to convince the patient that there is no indication for
a requested intervention, the GP is an active gatekeeper
even if the result is that the patient gets his or her own way
in the end.
But aren't we gatekeepers when we put up barriers for people by
discussing things and putting forward arguments, even when
the conclusion is that the person gets what he wants? Isn't that
another way of being a gatekeeper?
(Male GP, 3 years experience as a GP)
Professional autonomy
Most of the informants were concerned about the degree
of professional autonomy and freedom in their work,
both in rationing decisions and in how to run their prac-
tice. Hence the concept of professional autonomy as it is
used here is dual, incorporating autonomy in relation to
patients and autonomy in relation to the health authori-
ties.
Some stated that the relative freedom of GPs compared to
for example hospital physicians was an important reason
for their initial career choice. During interviews, some
informants initially claimed that their professional auton-
omy is not at all complicated by patients' demands and
government guidelines for rationing, but during the dis-
cussions it became evident that many informants are fear-
ful that they are gradually losing their traditional freedom
and autonomy in clinical decision making. Many illustra-
tive examples were given of how difficult it is to maintain
an autonomous position.BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:70 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/70
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Early in the interviews several informants claimed that, in
situations where there is room for discretionary choice,
they are influenced neither by patients nor by health
authorities.
I would never compromise my own judgement and give patients
what they want all the time just to keep them on my list. [...] I
have to say that professional concerns always come first, before
that sort of selfish need.
(Female GP specialist, 20 years of experience as a GP)
In contrast a few informants explained how they refer to
government rules and guidelines because it makes it easier
to refuse demands from patients.
If they come in and say that they're depressed and so on, it can
be difficult, but it's tidier if you follow the rules. So I prefer to
tell them that these are the rules instead of making exceptions
in individual cases, because that's a dangerous path.
(Female GP specialist, 16 years of experience as a GP)
There were several informants who conveyed a feeling of
conflict between professional autonomy and rules and
guidelines set by central health authorities. One example
much discussed was the use of statins and anti-hyperten-
sives:
Question: Do you find that the limits the government has set
are clear when it comes to anti-hypertensives and statins?
Informant: No. I tend to stick to my own, let's say, professional
judgement and not to any official limitations. That is definitely
the case.
(Female GP specialist, 15 years of experience as a GP)
Another matter is the kind of public finance decision about
which level of spending to choose. How much money does Nor-
way as a society want to spend on anti-hypertensives, and how
much does Russia want to spend? It's a political decision. The
reason why it's sensible to have a spending limit in a country is
of course that if all physicians have different limits and some of
them are treating patients too aggressively while others are not
treating aggressively enough, then the cost-benefit of the use of
medicines is less, and it becomes more or less random which
group of patients gets help. If there had been an absolute limit,
and the limit was set at a reasonable level, maybe not a choles-
terol level of 8.2 but let's say 7.5, then the physicians would
have to respect the rule and the patients who did not fulfil this
criterion but still were eager to get treatment could pay for it
themselves.  [The levels as they are set today] are not
respected by GPs, and that may be because the criteria are unre-
alistic, and we are trying to satisfy our patients.
(Male GP specialist, 4 years of experience as a GP)
Others said that the rules for remunerated prescribing are
perfectly clear and that they never bend them. However,
such statements tended to be moderated or even contra-
dicted later in the discussion. Sometimes one of the par-
ticipants provoked this openness by admitting to bending
the rules for remunerated prescriptions or to referring
without sufficient medical indications.
A fear of losing professional autonomy because of eco-
nomic incentives and competition was expressed by many
of our informants, although not always in a straightfor-
ward or personal manner. Below are two quotes from the
same informant, the first early in the interview and the
second later as the discussion had accelerated:
1: Our decisions are always based on our professional judge-
ment. The reform [the new capitation- and list-based sys-
tem] has had no influence whatsoever.
2: A relatively serious drawback [of the reform] is that you are
forced to become a peddler. At the start it made the hairs at the
back of my neck stand on end. It feels very unpleasant. Once
you've gone along with this premise I think it's a terribly sad sit-
uation for our health services as a whole. It has huge conse-
quences ...
(Male GP, 6 years of experience as a GP)
Patient autonomy
There were repeated claims that patients have become bet-
ter informed about their rights as patients, and that they
appear increasingly demanding. When discussing why
they give in to patients' demands even when the claims are
not clearly within what would be defined as medically
necessary; many referred to the ideal of patient autonomy
and patient centred care which implies respect for
patients' subjective experience and sharing decisions with
patients.
What we see as trivial and marginal can be very important for
the patient for some reason or other that is not immediately
clear. When it comes to referrals for instance, it's incredible
how manywomen want to see a gynaecologist for no apparent
reason. Most are persuaded not to, but some have had an aunt
who had ovarian cancer and they tell you that they're worried
because of that. One woman told me that she had found a
whole new life after she started visiting the gynaecologist once
a year. Then it is not marginal after all.
(Female GP, 4 years of experience as a GP)
I have not experienced much conflict when it comes to saying
"no", maybe because we manage to rationalise it so that itBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:70 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/70
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becomes reasonable to say "yes", i.e. you refer a patient for a CT
scan, or something like that, even though it is obvious to you
that medically the patient doesn't need it. But they can become
quite anxious, and this is one of your regular patients, and you
know that one way of getting rid of the problem is to do it even
though you know that medically it is absolutely unlikely that
they will find anything. And of course there is always a risk that
they do find something. I have been asking myself whether I am
able to give a categorical "no" to a demanding patient with
whom I expect to have a long-term relationship.
(Male GP specialist, 21 years of experience as a GP)
A common explanation for why it is difficult to say no was
the need for social approval.
What's quite typical for the way some colleagues work, and
maybe sometimes for the way we work too, is that we're inter-
ested in getting the patient admitted to the right place, to the
right hospitals, to the right specialists, because then we get
happy and satisfied patients.
(Male specialist GP, 20 years of experience as a GP)
The participants were also concerned about avoiding con-
flicts with patients. The physicians described in detail how
they manage to avoid conflict by explaining their medical
opinion and sharing decisions with patients. The majority
claimed that talking with and convincing the patient vir-
tually kept them out of conflict with patients.
Most often, to avoid conflict, I try to get the patient to share my
view.
(Male GP, 3 years of experience as a GP)
However, they often give in when the patient is not con-
vinced:
You might call it gatekeeping if you could explain to him [a
patient] that he could manage without the CT scan that it
ended up with. But it was quite obvious that to him having the
scan was a reasonable way of getting rid of the worry. So that
is probably the way it works. You could define gatekeeping as
pushing it until you see that there is a real need that is reason-
able. Then you rarely get into that conflict. But you would get
into that conflict if you received a message from the radiology
department telling you that the monthly budget was up, but we
don't, you know.
(Male specialist GP, 21 years of experience as a GP)
Competition
The physicians generally agreed that they find themselves
increasingly drawn into a health care market, where
patients act as demanding consumers and they as physi-
cians compete to please these consumers.
Some patients put pressure on the physician to write out a sick
leave certificate or prescribe when it perhaps isn't necessary.
And if you don't do it, you might be pressured and they might
leave for another GP.
(Male GP, 2 years of experience as a GP)
For others it was problematic to admit to being influenced
by economic incentives. One of the informants initially
answered "no" to our question whether the economic and
social incentives in the patient list system influenced his
discretionary choices, and he continues:
1: It can't be that one suddenly should treat patients differently
in consultations. That would be strange, wouldn't it? Because I
believe that would mean that we are driven by organisational
moves rather than our own medical understanding.
(Male GP, 3 years of experience as a GP)
Later in the interview session, the same informant com-
ments on the same question:
2: I think maybe that GPs are behaving differently [after new
incentives were introduced]. Why on earth one would do
that is of course a question, but ...
A general impression from the interviews was willingness
to departure from adherence to government rules for e.g.
reimbursed prescriptions, in order to satisfy the patients:
I suppose we have all prescribed cortisone creams and asthma
medication and things like that as standard prescriptions [i.e.
covered by the National Insurance Scheme]. Isn't that
right? I mean, the combination of regular patients and the
demands made by consumers in the health care market, they
won't wait or take no for an answer, right? And I am not sure
we are good at setting limits to control it.
(Male specialist GP, 21 years of experience as a GP)
One reason given for not adhering to the remuneration
guidelines was that it is pointless to ration if patients can
get what they want from somebody else. This argument
clearly also touches on the element of competition for
patients.
A new patient came in who had several things she wanted me
to look at. I had just given her three prescriptions and then she
adds that she just wanted a prescription she had had before,
which I didn't know about as she was a completely new patient.
So I wrote out a private prescription [i.e. not covered by theBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:70 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/70
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National Insurance Scheme] for her, and then she says, "But
I usually get a standard prescription!" Then her time was up,
and I thought "I can't stand listening to all the details and dis-
cussing them," so I just said "Fine" and wrote her the standard
prescription.
(Female specialist GP, 15 years of experience as a GP)
Competing and compatible motivators
A key finding is that the obligation to ration health care is
not generally embraced by GPs. Professional norms and
respect for patient autonomy on the other hand, are
strongly emphasized as integrated and at the very core of
their professional judgement. When it comes to the role of
economic incentives, the statements are more ambiguous.
The idea of economic incentives is sometimes dismissed
as an external factor without power to influence GP deci-
sion making whatsoever, while some informants state that
they are worried that market mechanisms are gradually
undermining professional autonomy.
General practitioners in our study find themselves caught
in a web of conflicting concerns presented here as the four
main topics. Some of these motives are easy to combine
and some are often experienced as conflicting. In the par-
agraphs about rationing and patient autonomy we
reported the participants descriptions of how a firm pro-
fessional autonomy in relation to patients is experienced
as a necessary requirement to fulfil the rationing role,
because in the current system with universal coverage by a
third party payer and free choice of healthcare provider
combined with capitation and competition for patients, it
is tempting to go along with patients' wishes. At the same
time rationing is often presented as in conflict with
respect for patient autonomy. On the other hand, as the
findings in the paragraph about competition suggest,
respect for patient autonomy is easily combined with the
situation of competition and the economic incentives of
fee-for-service and capitation. So a central line of conflict
seems to be how to balance the obligation to ration health
care combined with professional autonomy in relation to
patients on the one side and the demand for patient
autonomy combined with concerns about competition
for patients on the other.
Discussion
Summing up, the central finding was that when the phy-
sicians discuss why rationing can be difficult, they empha-
size that saying no in face to face relations often is felt
uncomfortable and in conflict with other important
objectives.
In a health care system with universal coverage and gate
keeping through general practice, rationing presupposes a
relatively high level of professional autonomy in relation
to patients, but this is often in conflict with other ideals
and motives faced by the modern physician, such as
respect for patient autonomy. This finding supports other
studies in Norway and abroad, describing a dilemma
between the roles of gatekeeper and the patient's advocate
[15]. In addition, there seems to be a lack of understand-
ing of the rationale behind rationing accompanied by a
low degree of adherence to government guidelines. There
is apparently a lack of clarity in the signals from the health
authorities on how principles for priority setting and
rationing should be applied in primary care, but part of
the explanation seem to lie in the GPs' concern for
upholding their professional autonomy in relation to the
health authorities.
It is interesting to ask whether physicians' avoidance of
explicit rationing is related to the evolving shift in power
from GP to patient. According to Daniels [30], already
twenty years ago physicians in the US found it difficult to
say no to patients. In the NHS/Scandinavian type of
health care system patients have been used to GPs acting
as gatekeepers, but now the Norwegian system is changing
and patients seem to be beginning to demand their rights
as consumers. Physicians, both as a group and in their
meeting with patients, are experiencing a decline in status
and a loss of autonomy. This is a widely recognised phe-
nomenon and a recurring concern in medical professional
discourse [31-34]. At a theoretical level the problem is ele-
gantly solved – the modern physician should seek part-
nership with patients, ground decisions in evidence-based
medicine and surrender to transparency and accountabil-
ity in their practice [2,34-36] – but our results suggest that
things are not so simple in practice. When the interview-
ees discuss how it is sometimes experienced as very diffi-
cult to say no to insistent patients, it implies that rationing
in practice and especially in face-to-face relationships is
quite another task than priority setting and rationing at
the macro level. For many GPs, it is problematic even to
talk about such divergent and conflicting motives.
Interestingly, there are studies, especially those focusing
on patients' experiences that find that patients seldom
challenge the physician's autonomy [2]. Some studies of
the patient's role claim that patients do not experience
themselves as powerful in meetings with the physician
[2]. This is also demonstrated in a Norwegian study of the
illness experience of Norwegian chronic back pain suffer-
ers [37]. However, there is not necessarily any contradic-
tion in divergent views between physicians and patients.
In fact, it has been shown in several studies of doctor-
patient communication that whether the physician expe-
riences pressure from the patient is a more powerful pre-
dictor of the physician's actions than the actual
preferences of patients [38-40]. This might imply, as sug-
gested by Rogers [41], that physicians' stories of demand-BMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:70 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/70
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ing patients are sometimes an excuse when the actual
explanation is to be found in private economic motives or
low awareness of the need for rationing. Elston [36], in
her criticism of the deprofessionalisation thesis, also sup-
ports this view. She claims that the so-called deprofession-
alisation and alleged loss of power of the medial
profession is exaggerated. It is not so much a question of
whether physicians are capable of carrying out rationing
as whether they want to. Likewise Frankel and colleagues
[42] suggest that part of the claims of unsatisfied demand
in the NHS spring from professional self interest of the
NHS-employees.
The ethics of the profession still emphasise that to be a
physician is not like other jobs, and the altruistic profes-
sional is contrasted with the amoral and therefore untrust-
worthy expert governed by market forces [43,44]. In this
context, being a physician is still presented as a vocation
to do good, as an art of caring for the individual patient's
needs. The physician as rationing agent is less discussed.
The introduction of "anti-professional" incentives such as
external surveillance and control as well as the incentives
of consumerism can be viewed as the start of a negative
spiral [36], as some of the interviewees also indicate. At
the same time the modern physician is expected to respect
patients' or consumers' autonomy in clinical decision
making and to practise patient-centred medicine, which is
associated with more satisfied patients and a better health
outcome [44,45]. According to this influential research, in
clinical decision making the physician should also con-
sider the patient's experience of the symptoms and
include such subjective factors in addition to the biomed-
ical facts. Keeping this context in mind it is not difficult to
comprehend the informants' ambiguous attitudes toward
increasing consumerism in health care and why profes-
sional autonomy might be experienced as a competing
concern to patient autonomy.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Focus groups were chosen in preference to other qualita-
tive methodologies because they have been shown to be a
useful method of revealing attitudes to complex and sen-
sitive topics [46], partly because the more reserved partic-
ipants are encouraged by participants who are less
inhibited [53]. Participants should have a similar back-
ground in relation to the topic to be discussed. In a group
of peers where the participants are in the majority, it
appears that they are more able and willing to clarify and
express thoughts that are difficult to reveal in one-to-one
interviews [47,48]. This enhances the common ground
and clarifies the prevailing opinions within the specific
group under study, as well as the rationale behind them.
Thus the focus group interview has been reported to have
advantages when the purpose is to reveal common norms
in groups of peers, as for example professional groups
[53]. On the other hand, focus groups may not be suitable
for exploring individual opinions that diverge from group
norms [53]. The group context will sometimes scare par-
ticipants from voicing disagreement.
The main purpose of this study was to reveal common
experiences and professional culture regarding the gate-
keeper role rather than to investigate individual cases or
register the whole spectre of opinions. We therefore
decided that focus groups would be more appropriate
than for instance individual interviews. we did, however,
decide to register how much each participant spoke dur-
ing the focus group meetings to get an indication of the
level of dissent voiced in the groups. We found that the
proportion of speech varied extensively between partici-
pants, and that those who expressed the strongest opin-
ions spoke the most. This picture is in agreement with our
general impressions of the interviews, and it appears that
the participants were not afraid of confronting each
other's opinions. While it would also have been an advan-
tage to know what was left unspoken, The GPs seem to
have a strong feeling of professional loyalty that might
have prevented interviewees from revealing opinions that
are at odds with the collegial culture. It is therefore doubt-
ful whether this type of data would have emerged if we
had had the opportunity to interview all the participants
individually afterwards.
Focus groups have a limited value in drawing conclusions
on the distribution of different opinions in the popula-
tion. The sample of GPs participating in these interviews
is similar to the general populations of Norwegian GPs
according to a few measurable characteristics, as we have
described elsewhere [22]. However this is not a ran-
domised sample and we are not aiming at calculating the
proportion of Norwegian GPs that would agree with one
or all of the arguments presented here. Rather it is reason-
able to expect that our interpretations shed light on some
of the important elements that influence the countless
daily rationing decisions made by modern GPs.
During the interviews there were several indications that
we had struck on a sensitive subject with our focus on dis-
cretionary choices and how physicians are influenced by
patients and economic incentives. In some sense we were
questioning their professional autonomy. A fairly recent
study by Pearson and Hyams suggests that physicians are
reluctant to discuss conflicts of interest in medical deci-
sion making [49]. It might be argued that our role in the
groups was adding to the complications of a difficult
topic. Though not explicitly stated, our introduction and
the context of the study, (we were funded by the Ministry
of Health through the Norwegian research council to
assess how the influence of the patient-list system affects
rationing – decisions), gave the participants reason toBMC Health Services Research 2005, 5:70 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/5/70
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believe that we could be promoting the need to ration
health care and would expect the GPs to be rationing
agents in accordance with governmental policy and guide-
lines.
One indication that the topic was felt to be uncomfortable
appears when contrasting the initial answers with the
statements made as the participants engaged in group dis-
cussion. Several times participants started out by rejecting
the focus of the study as irrelevant to their own practice
experience. Others said that they did not experience any
form of predicament themselves as they were simply prac-
tising medicine and were not influenced by economic or
other external factors in their discretionary choices. In
spite of the slow start of the interviews, we found that atti-
tudes changed throughout each interview from at times
quite robust and categorical negative responses to the
question of possible dilemmas in medical decision mak-
ing to a more nuanced and positive response and enthusi-
astic discussion as the interview proceeded. An equivalent
response is reported by Marshall et al. in a focus group
study of quality assessment in primary care [50]. Marshall
et al. term this "initial vs. considered response". It may
well be argued that what we observe is simply a sign of the
participants considering the questions in depth for the
first time and thus changing their answers. This may also
be a characteristic quality of the group process that,
together with the comfort of being among peers and out-
numbering the researchers, explains why group interviews
are an appropriate tool for studying sensitive topics.
We interpret the contradictions and initial unwillingness
to discuss discretionary choice as a sign of conflicting ide-
als, of which the participants are either conscious or not.
It is apparent that it is not unproblematic morally to be
influenced by economic incentives, and even being influ-
enced by patients' wishes seems to be difficult to acknowl-
edge.
A limitation of the study is that it does not give us any cer-
tain knowledge about the actual behaviour of the physi-
cians. Informants may not describe their actions correctly,
either because they are unaware of or do not remember
their own pattern of actual choices or because they do not
wish to reveal them [51] and according to Fernadez et al.
[52] GPs consider it legitimate to be influenced by profes-
sional standards while to be influenced by financial
incentives is not considered legitimate. In this Spanish
survey, the responding GPs considered that they were
most influenced by the most legitimate factors and least
influenced by the least legitimate factors.
A final point to keep in mind is that since rationing as a
subject was introduced by the researchers as part of the
stated starting point for the group discussions, it is not
possible on the basis of these data to estimate how much
of the physicians' consciousness is devoted to rationing in
their daily practice.
Conclusion
Based on the discussions within our selection of Norwe-
gian general practitioners, we extract some competing
concerns that complicate rationing decisions in primary
care and make it difficult to say no to patients who insist
on receiving services even when their demands are in con-
flict with a commitment to legitimate and fair resource
allocation. Two central dilemmas are:
• It is often experienced as difficult to make rationing deci-
sions within the context of patient centred medicine
• The current economic incentives do not combine well
with making rationing decisions.
Although we do not claim that the informants in this
study are representative of GPs everywhere and the find-
ings in this study must be interpreted within the special
organisational context of the current Norwegian primary
care system, we still believe that it yields interesting
knowledge about how different concerns are balanced
against one another. The main factors we found influenc-
ing these GPs are quite similar to what other studies find
both in the Norway and abroad. This and other studies
suggest that in a publicly financed health care system we
need a better understanding of the relationship between
incentives used in the management of primary care,
increasing patient autonomy and the willingness among
physicians to contribute to efficient, fair and legitimate
resource allocation.
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